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Abstract 
There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribution games 
(or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where in equilibrium a minimal 
winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else .. Here we extend the study to an 
n-person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy 
space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo. Briefly, we find a Nash 
equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the Pareto 
optimal set and the Pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values, 
and punishments are never implemented. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under 
two different agendas - sequential recognition and random recognition - we find that 
there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition 
rule. We also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate 
proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely. 
Veto Games: Spatial Committees Under Unanimity 
Rule* 
Yan Chen Peter C. Ordeshook 
1 Introduction 
Despite the apparent ascendancy of democratic ideas and ideals, there are serious imped­
iments to their universal acceptance and application. Foremost among them, especially 
in ethnically divided societies, is the matter of majority tyranny in majoritarian institu­
tions. When the definition and description of minorities has deep historical roots, when 
a majority is easily identifiable, and when members of all groups are conscious of their 
status (e.g ., Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, Tatars in Russia, Russians in most of the succes­
sor states of the former Soviet empire, Hungarians in Romania, and Turks in Bulgaria), 
then minorities are unlikely to acquiesce to the implementation of any structure that 
allows majorities to dictate policy. Indeed, as Madison warned, democracies constructed 
on pure majoritarian principles "have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; 
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and 
have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths" and 
as Calhoun [5] argues subsequently, "the numerical majority, perhaps, should usually be 
one of the elements of a constitutional democracy; but to make it the sole element . .. is 
one of the greatest and most fatal of political errors." 
A number of devices have been proposed to treat the problems associated with simple 
majoritarinism, including federalism and bicameralism. Such arrangements seek to pro­
tect minorities by raising the vote quota necessary to alter the status quo ( c.f., Riker [12], 
Hammond and Miller [6]). Generally, though, these devices refrain from taking matters 
to their natural limit - unanimity rule - in which every individual or identifiable group 
possesses a veto over change. Although minorities may demand a veto before agreeing to 
*The authors wish to thank Elizabeth Gerber, Richard McKelvey, and Scott Page for their comments 
on earlier drafts of the paper. This research was partially funded by a grant from the United States 
Institute of Peace to the California Institute of Technology. 
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any constitutionally defined union, others fear that "misuse" of the veto will render the 
state incapable of formulating useful policy. The implementation of democratic princi­
ples, then, appears to entail a choice between the tyranny and deadlock (Buchanan and 
Tullock [4]). 
To evaluate this concern fully, though, requires that we take cognizance of the fact 
that constitutional matters rarely if ever focus on static situations. Political processes 
are ongoing so that agreements reached today can sometimes be enforced by punishments 
applied tomorrow. A constitutional issue such as minority rights is rarely "decided in 
perpetuity" - even if not explicitly debated, those rights must be implicitly and continu­
ously maintained. Similarly, although a veto may yield deadlock in one period, unanimity 
rule may be little more than a device for upgrading the strategic capabilities of minorities 
so that they are better equipped to protect their rights over the long term. Thus, una­
nimity rule merely sets the stage for bargaining among groups, where the consequences 
of bargaining is a continual stream of outcomes that may or may not be Pareto efficient 
and that may or may not satisfy various criteria of fairness and equity. 
Existing models of bargaining establish, in fact, that a veto need not imply deadlock 
or inefficiency. For example, Rubinstein [13] and Binmore and Herrera's [3] analyses 
of 2-person bargaining, which model unanimity rule in that mututally disadvantageous 
outcomes are averted only if both persons reach agreement, reveal that deadlock is avoid­
able and that mutually beneficial outcomes do correspond to subgame perfect equilibria. 
Unfortunately, these models and their extension to a more explicitly policial realm (c.f., 
Baron and Ferejohn [2], McKelvey and Reizman [9]) are not sufficiently general for our 
purposes. They assume that bargaining is purely redistributive - that the decision con­
fronting people is the division of some fixed pie. Although redistributive matters are 
important, the usual context for constitutional failure - ethnic conflict - entails issues 
over which sidepayments are difficult or impossible to implement directly. Moreover, the 
"disagreement point" - the outcome that prevails if no unanimous agreement is reached 
- need not be mutually destructive. If disagreement implies secession and dissolution 
of the state, this outcome may be one that, as in Czechoslovakia, the majority deems 
acceptable. 
A number of questions about unanimity rule's operation, then, remain unanswered. 
First, is a dynamic conceptualization of political processes sufficient to avert the most 
common objections to unanimity rule's implementation? Second, what types of policies 
will result if changes in the welfare of one group, owing to the structure of the issues being 
debated, necessarily exhibit both positive and negative externalities for other groups in 
society? And third, what disadvantages accrue to a minority that cannot control the 
agenda whereby alternatives to the status quo are considered? 
This essay addresses these questions by offering a model of an n-person committee 
(legislature) in which there is a proposer who is empowered to offer an alternative to the 
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status quo and in which that status quo is changed only by unanimous consent. How­
ever, our analysis departs from earlier bargaining models in four ways. First, rather than 
assume that alternatives correspond to divisions of a fixed pie, we assume that the com­
mittee is concerned with policies in some Euclidean policy space and that preferences in 
this space are modeled by Euclidean distance. Second, we assume that the disagreement 
point is a status quo outcome that need not be "bad" from everyone's perspective. Third, 
although, as in the Rubinstein et al framework, we assume that proposals are made and 
voted on sequentially in an infinite sequence, we consider two rules whereby people are 
empowered to make proposals: a sequential rule and a random recognition rule. For both 
rules we find a Nash equilibrium in which the first proposer offers an alternative in the 
intersection of the Pareto optimal and Pareto superior policy set. Finally, we consider 
the possibility that the committee might chose to "rotate" proposals as in the Swiss or 
ex-Yugoslavia rotating presidencies. 
Generally, our conclusions match the intuition that existing models of bargaining 
might generate about veto games. We find that unanimity rule need not afford an over­
whelming advantage to whoever controls the agenda whereby alternatives to the status 
quo are considered. On the other hand, once a policy is Pareto optimal in a dynamic 
sense, then, regardless of its perceived fairness, it becomes the status quo in perpetu­
ity. We also characterize the neccessary and sufficient conditions for dynamically Pareto 
optimal policy paths, and show when a rotation scheme is advantageous implementable 
policy. 
2 The General Framework 
We begin with some notation in order to introduce that game that models unanimity 
voting. F irst, we let N = { 1 ,  2, · · · , n} be the set of pl ayers or voters, X <:;: Rn be the set 
of alternative pol icies, and </> be a nul l outcome that is merely a notational convenience. 
Next, we assume that each voter i E N has a von Neumann-Morgenstern util it y function 
Ui : XU { </>} ---+ R, where ui (x ) = ui(lx - a;i) represents the utility i E N receives when 
the policy position is x. Thus, i's utility decreases with the distance between the policy 
position and his ideal point, ai, and achieves its maximum at ai. Also, we let ui ( </>) = 0 
and assume that ui( ·) is quasi-concave. 
There are now three subsets of X that warrant special attention, XPI, Xps and Xpo. 
Denoting the status quo pol icy outcome by x0 E X, these three sets are defined thus: 
XPI = {x E X: ui ( x) < ui (xo) , Vi EN} 
is the Pareto inferior set; 
Xps = {x E X: u; (x) 2:: u;(xo ) , Vi EN} 
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is the Pareto superior set. The Pareto optimal set is defined in the usual way as 
Xpo = {x EX :�y EX s.t. ui(Y) � ui(x), Vi EN and ui(Y) > ui(x) for at least one i}. 
Finally, we let 8i E [O, 1] denote the discount factor i uses to discount future streams of 
utility. 
The preceding three sets are static concepts. Since we want to study the infinite 
horizon veto game, we need their corresponding dynamic formulation. Hence, we define 
a path, 0( x0, x1, • • • , xt, · · · ), as a sequence of policy positions, starting from period zero 
to period infinity. We let 0 and 0' denote 0( x0, x1, · · · , xt, . . .  ) and O(y0, y 1, . . .  , yt, . . .  ) 
respectively, and we let Ui(O) = L:�o 8fui(xt) and Ui(O') = L:�o 8fui(Yt) denote the 
infinite stream of utility player i gets from the paths 0 and O', respectively. Then 
XDPI ={BEX: Ui(B) < �ui(x0), Vi EN} 1 - Vi 
is the dynamic Pareto inferior set, 
is the dynamic Pareto superio r set. The dynamic Pareto optimal set is simply XDPO = 
{OE X :�()'EX s.t. Ui(B') � Ui(B), Vi EN and Ui(B') > U;(B) for at least one i} .  
Turning now to the bargaining game, if we take the example of n = 3, then under 
a sequential recognition rule, the three voters have a predetermined order for making 
proposals - first voter 1 ,  then 2, then 3, then 1 again, and so on - where x; denotes 
player i's proposal. Thus, if voter 1 proposes x1 and if neither 2 nor 3 veto, then X1 
becomes the new status quo, at which point player 2 has the opportunity to offer a new 
proposal. But, if either 2 or 3 veto, x0 remains the status quo and 2 has the next move. 
In contrast, with a random recognition rule, nature chooses the voter who will make a 
proposal at every stage. 
To analyse these two situations formally, we make use of the following additional 
notation. First, we let T be the set of states that can be achieved in a game - the nodes 
in the game's extensive form. Next, we define a stochastic game, rt = (St, 7rt, 'lj;t), where 
5t is the set of pure .st rategy n tupl es (we .do not.consider mixed strategies), where 7rt: 
5t -t µ(T) is a t ransition function specifying for each st E 5t a probability distribution 
7rt( st) on T, and where 'lj;t : 5t -t X is an outcome function that specifies for each st E 5t 
an outcome 1/Jt (st) E X. Finally, we use S = TitET 5t to denote the collection of pure 
strategy n tuples, where 5t = TiiEN s;. 
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3 Results 
In the next three subsections, we first characterize the neccessary and sufficient conditions 
for dynamically Pareto optimal paths. We then study stationary Nash equilibria under 
the two recognition rules - sequential and random. Finally, we discuss the implementation 
of a rotation scheme as an application for unanimity rule. 
3.1 Dynamic Pareto Optimal Paths 
We begin with some general lemmas that help us subsequently characterize the properties 
of equilibria in the stochastic game we use to model unanimity voting. First, 
Lemma 1 For all xt E 0 C Xv po, xt E Xpo. 
Proof (By contradiction.) Suppose 0( x1, · · · , xs, · · · , xt, · · ·) C Xv po, and xs rf. Xpo, 
xt E Xpo, Vt =f s. Then, by the definition of Xpo, for any x E Xpo, we have ui( x) 2:: 
ui( X8) , for all i and, ui( x) > ui( xs), for at least one i. Denote 0' ( x1, · · · , xs-1, 
x,xs+1,···,x\···) = O', then Ui(O') 2". Ui(O), for all i. Therefore, 0 <t Xvpo, which 
is a contradiction. Similarly, for any path with more than one point outside Xpo, by 
replacing them by points inside Xpo, we get a Pareto superior path. By induction, we 
can show that for all xt E 0 C Xvpo, xt E Xpa. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 says that any dynamically Pareto optimal path consists only of points 
from the stationary Pareto optimal set. Intuitively, if a path has one point outside 
the stationary Pareto set, we can always substitute a point inside that set for it and 
make every player better off for that period and thus better off for the infinite sequence. 
However, the converse of Lemma 1 is not true: Paths that consist of points inside 'the 
stationary Pareto optimal set are not neccessarily dynamically Pareto optimal paths. To 
see then what types of paths are dynamically Pareto optimal, let a stationary path be a 
path that consists of the same point for every period. We use 0( x) to denote stationary 
path O(x, x, · · · ,  x, ···), and we say that a path(} is equivalent to another path()' for player 
i, if Ui(O) = Ui(O'). 
Lemma 2 Any path that consists of only Pareto optimal points, 0( x0, x1 , · · · , xt, · · ·), 
where xt E Xpo, is equivalent to a stationary path O;(x;) for each player i, where i E N 
and Xi E Xpo. 
Proof First we want to show how a path, O(x1, x2, • • ·, xt, ···),where xt E Xpo, can 
be broken down to an equivalent stationary path. 
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therefore, 
00 
L O'.itu;(xt) , 
t=O 
where I::�o O'.it = 1, and O'.it E (0, 1). This means that ui(x;) E co{ u;(xt)} , i.e., ui(x;) is 
in the convex hull of ui (xt) 's. Next, we want to show that Xi E Xp0. Consider the two 
extreme cases for player i: since ui(xi) = L�o a;tu;(xt) , Vi E N, and xt E Xpo, Vt, so 
for any player i, the best case occurs whenever Xi = ai; the worst case occurs whenever 
x; = aj, where aj = argmax{a-;}la-i - a;!. Therefore, on the line segment between a; 
and aj, there is at least one point that is the solution to the problem, which we denote 
by x;. Since Xpo is convex, Xi E Xpa. Q.E.D. 
Note that generally there is more than one solution to this problem. We call the set of 
all stationary optimal paths that are equivalent to () and that consist of all Pareto optimal 
points the trajectory of() for i, denoted by TRi(O) = {x E Xpo: Ui(x) = (1 - oi)Ui(O)}. 
From the quasiconcavity of ui(-) , it follows that T Ri( ·) is also quasiconca.ve. A closely 
related concept of the trajectory for player i is player i's better-than set of 0, Bi(O) = 
{x E Xpo : ui(lx - ail) 2 (1 - 8;)U;(O)}. The better-than set is the set of Pareto 
optimal points that are Pareto superior to the stationary equivalent pa.th of 0. From 
the monotonicity and quasi concavity of u;( · ) , it follows that B;( 0) is convex. The close 
relationship of T Ri( ·) and B;( ·) can be seen from the following observation, which derives 
from the monotonicity and quasiconcavity of the utility functions. 
Observation 1: niENT Ri( O) = </> iff niEN Bi(O) = </>, and 
TR;(O) = { x} iff niEN Bi(O) = { x}. 
We now want to characterize the neccessary and sufficient conditions for a path to be 
dynamically Pareto optimal. 
Proposition 1 A path 0 is dynamically Pareto optimal if and only if the intersection 
of all players' trajectories is empty or a singleton, i. e. , niENTRi(O) =</> or {x}. 
Proof: We first prove that niENT R;( 0) = <P or { x} =} () is dynamically Pareto optimal. 
( 1) When niEN TR; ( 0) = </>, suppose () is not dynamically Pareto optimal. Then there 
exists another path 0' such that U;(O') 2 U;(O), Vi, and U;(O') > U;(O), for at least one 
i. Denote the stationary equiva.lent path of()' by {xa , then {x:} E B;(O), for all i. So 
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niENBi(O) =I- </J. From niENT Ri(O) 
which is a contradiction. 
</>, and Observation 1, we have niENBi(O) </> ,  
(2) When niENTRi(O) = {x}, then niENBi(O) = {x}. It is obvious that(} is the only 
dynamically Pareto optimal path. 
To prove the converse, note that since(} is dynamically Pareto optimal, then ;BO', such 
that U;(O') � U;(O), Vi, and Ui(O') > U;(O), for at least one i. It follows that for each i, 
Bi ( 0) is empty or consists only of the stationary equivalent path of 0. So niEN Bi ( 0) = <P 
or {x}. From Observation 1, we have niENTR;(O) = <P or {x}. Q.E.D. 
3.2 Stationary Nash Equilibria and Two Recognition rules 
In this section, we study the simplest Nash equilibria in this infinite horizon veto game -
stationary Nash equilibria. For simplicity, we relegate to Appendix A the formal descrip­
tion of the stochastic veto game that we use to model unanimity rule, and the formal 
characterization of equilibrium strategies for this class of games. Omitting the super­
script t and concentrating on the position of the stationary path, which is subscripted by 
the proposer, we need to define here only the indicator function g( · ) in order to denote 
the results of a player's actions: 
· ( · ) = { 1, if player j accepts x; 91 x, 0, if player j vetos x;, 
{ 1 then Xi passes if g(xi) = 
�
· 
9j(Xi) = o
'
, h f 
.
1 t en x; a1 s. 
The strategies for proposers and voters are, 
Proposer i: 
Sj = Xi , 
x; E argmax EX {g(x;)[u;(x;) + D;v;(x;)] + (1 - g(x;))[u;(xo) + 8;v;(xo)]} ;  
Voter j: 
Sj = gj(x;) E {O, 1}, 
gj(x;) E argmax{o,1} {g(x;)[uj(x;) + 81v1(x;)] + (1 - g(xi))[uj(xo) + DfVj(xo)]} ,  
where Vj( · ) denotes player j's continuation value. 
In the stationary case, it follows from Lemma 1 that the dynamic Pareto optimal set 
coincides with the stationary Pareto set. Now consider two cases: the first is that the 
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status quo is inside the Pareto optimal set, and the second case is that the status quo is 
outside the Pareto set. In the first case, the stationary path O(x0) can be supported as 
a Nash equilibrium. Since any defection from the status quo to another path makes at 
least one player worse off, that player will veto the proposal. Formally, 
Observation 2 The following is a Nash equilibrium to the veto game: 
Xi= x0, Vi EN 
if Uj(O(xi · · ·)) 2: Uj(O(xo)) 
otherwise. 
Proof: By Proposition 1, 0 = O(xo, · · ·) E XDPO· Therefore, if 0' = O(x; · · ·) E XDPO, 
by definition of dynamic Pareto optimality, uk( 0) > uk( O') for at least one player, k. 
Hence, gk(xi) = 0, and g(x;) = 0. Similarly, if O(x; · · ·) f/. XDPO, 91(xo) = 0, for all 
j EN. Q.E.D. 
This observation says that when the status quo is inside the Pareto set, it is a Nash 
equilibrium for it to remain there infinitely. Obviously, this is not a very interesting 
situation. So consider the second case, where the status quo is outside the Pareto set, 
and consider the two recognition rules - sequential and random. 
We begin by offering an additional lemma (see Appendix B for proof), that is useful 
in analysing the game under both agenda settings. 
Lemma 3 There exists a Nash equilibrium strategy to the veto game that satisfies the 
following properties: 
x; E Xso, Vi EN; 
9j(xi) = 0, if Xi ti. Xso, where Xso = Xpo n Xps. 
This lemma identifies a Nash equilibrium strategy in which the proposer offers a 
policy in the intersection of the Pareto optimal and Pareto superior sets, and the voters 
veto any other policy. The intuition behind this lemma and its characterization of the 
proposer's offer is two-fold. First, it should be evident that the new policy must be an 
element of the Pareto superior set, otherwise whoever prefers the status quo to the new 
policy will veto the proposal. Second, given the voters' continuation values, by moving 
in the direction of the Pareto optimal set, the proposer can make some voters better off 
without making the others worse off. Therefore, he can move to a higher indifference 
curve by proposing a position inside the Pareto optimal set while simultaneously giving 
each voter their continuation values. So the proposer is never worse off by offering a 
policy in the intersection of the Pareto superior set and the Pareto optimal set. 
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I. Sequential Recognition Rule 
Under a sequential recognition rule, the proposer offers in equilibrium a policy closest 
to his ideal point that gives every other voter their continuation values; voters accept 
any proposal that gives them their continuation values and veto any proposal that gives 
them utility less than these values. 
Proposition 2 The following is a stationary Nash equilibrium to the veto game under 
sequential proposing rule: 
For Proposer i: 
For Voter j: 
x; E argmaxxEXso[u;(x;)] 
( ) k-1 [Jk Uj X; � I ) j ( ) . . s.t.-- c- = � 8ju)(x0 + ---cu) Xj , VJ -/:- z, 1-u- 1-u· J l=O J 
where k = . . { J 
- z, 
n - z + J, 
if j > i 
if j < i. 
·( ·) _ , z 1_8 _ vj x, { 1 f 
u1(x;) > *(·) gJ x, - J .  0, otherwise, 
h *( ·) - ""k-l d ·( ) + _!1__ ·( ·) w ere vj x, �1=o ujuJ x0 1_8 u3 x3 • J 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
This proposition gives equilibrium strategies for both the initial proposer and all 
other voters. In contra.st to the commonly accepted notion that unanimity rule induces 
punishment strategies and inefficiency, in equilibrium, the first proposition is accepted 
and lies in the Pareto optimal set and punishments are never implemented. That every 
player is a blocking coalition, however, leads to a more "equitable" outcome. That is, 
the kind of equilibria that we often find under majority rule, in which a minimal winning 
coalition divides the pie among its members and leaves all others with nothing, cannot 
occur here. 
II. Random Recognition Rule 
Under the random recognition rule, we get a similar result as that under sequential 
recognition rule - a stationary Nash equilibrium where the proposer proposes a policy 
position closest to his own ideal point that still gives every voter their continuation 
values. Voters accept any proposal that gives them their continuation values, and veto 
any position that gives them less. More formally, if we let Vii _ �ii�:), th{'n 
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Proposition 3 The following zs a stationary Nash equilibrium under a random 
recognition rule: 
For Proposer i: 
For Voter j: 
1 "J u1(x;.) > * ' z I-81 - vi 
0, otherwise. 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
Unlike outcomes under sequential recognition rule, then, and a.s expected, a.11 voters 
a.re treated equally here, without the bias from the order to propose. In this sense, then, 
this is a. more "equitable" agenda.. 
3.3 Rotation Schemes 
To this point we have considered only stationary strategies in which ea.ch person's contin­
uation value is calculated under the assumption that any Pareto optimal policy remains 
in effect forever. Consider, though, the possibility that the voters agree beforehand to 
rotate policies among themselves - choosing first a policy that is "good" for voter 1, then 
one that is "good" for voter 2, and so on. The question is whether, with Euclidean pref­
erences, such a scheme has any advantages for a.11 voters over a. fixed policy and whether 
it can be implemented under unanimity rule. 
To address this question, we begin by representing a. rotation scheme in a. n-person 
veto game as a dynamic path, 0( x1, x2, · · · , xn, x1, x2, · · · , xn, · · · ) . The trajectory of the 
pa.th for player i is TR;( 0) = { x E Xpo : ui( x) = (1 - 8;)U;( O)}, which can be simplified 
. 81-I 
to TR;(O) = { x E Xpo : u;(x) = l:j=1aju;(xJ)}, where CYj = l+8;+'··+8n-i· From 
Proposition 1, we know that a rotation path 0 is dynamically Pareto optimal 1if and only 
if the intersection of a.11 trajectories of 0 is either empty or consisted only of a. singleton. 
Thus, 
Corollary A rotation scheme 0( x1, x2, • • • , xn, x1, x2, • • • , xn, · · · ) is dynamically Pareto 
optimal i.ff niENTR;(O) =</>or {x} , where TR;(O) = { x E Xpo: u;(x) = "L:j=1 aju;(xj)} 
81-1 
and where aj = 1+8;+
' 
.. +8�_1. 
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To establish the existence of an optimal rotation scheme, we take an optimal station­
ary path and perturb it into an equivalent rotation path. Illustrating this approach for 
the three person case, take O(x,x,··· ,x,···), where x E Xpo, and denote the rotation 
path by O'(x1,x2,x3,x1 ,x2,x3,···). We want to show that there exists (x1 ,x2,x3) such 
that 0 is equivalent to 0', which is the same as saying that Ui(O) = Ui(O'), for all i. For 
the 3-person case, we know that Ui(O) = 128;ui(x) and Ui(O') = 1!83ui(x
1 )+ 1�i83ui(x2)+ 
2 - ' l 
1�i83 ui( x3). The optimal rotation path can be found by solving the system of equations, 
Ui(O) - Ui(O') = 0, for all i, which can be simplified into 
ui(x1 ) + 8iui(x2) + 8tui(x3) - (1 + 8i + 8?}ui(x) = 0, for all i. 
Solving this system of equations yields a dynamically optimal rotation. For example, 
suppose in a two dimensional policy space that all players have quadratic utility functions 
of the form, ui(x) = -[(x1 - ai)2 + (y1 -bi)2], where x = (x1,y1). Let the players' ideal 
points be (ai,b1) = (-2, 0), (a2,b2) = (2, 0), (a3, b3) = (0, 3.46 ), and (x,y) = (0, 1). Let 
81 = .5, 82 = .3, 83 = .5. Although the three equations and six unknowns yield several 
solutions, one without imaginary roots is (0.20, 1), (-1.37, 1) and (0.23, 2). 
Insofar as implementing this scheme is concerned, its enforcement is assured if a very 
bad status quo prevails whenever any player defects from the path by vetoing the next 
policy in the sequence. We can formalize this idea in the following proposition (see 
Appendix C for proof). 
Proposition 4 When veto by a player causes the default outcome to be x0 r/. Xpo U 
Xps, a Pareto optimal rotation scheme can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium. 
This proposition says that when defecting from the Pareto optimal rotation path 
leads to a "bad" default outcome, which makes everybody worse off, the rotation scheme 
can be implemented in the sense that it is a Na.sh equilibrium for every proposer to offer 
a policy along the path, and it is a Nash equilibrium for every voter to agree to any 
proposal along the path and to veto any defection from the path. 
4 Conclusions 
For the most part, our results are not unexpected. The outcomes that prevail parallel 
in form those that prevail under the assumption that voters must divide some fixed pie. 
First, equilibria are efficient in the sense that all outcomes and all dynamic paths are 
Pareto optimal. Second, unanimity is more "equitable" than simple majority rule in that 
a majority cannot wholly expropriate from a minority. Third, different recognition rules 
yield different equilibrium outcomes. A sequential recognition rule is more advantageous 
to players who propose early, whereas this advantage disappears under a random recog­
nition rule. Finally, Euclidean preferences allow for the implementation of a rotation 
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scheme that is enforced by a combination of unanimity rule and the threat of a mutually 
disadvantageous status quo that prevails if any voter defects from his equilibrium strat­
egy. More generally, our analysis establishes that much of our intuition about unanimity 
rule does not require any specific assumptions about transferable utility and the like for 
its validity. The result that we might infer from pre-existing bargaining models hold 
when we extend the analysis to Euclidean preferences and nontransferable utility. 
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Appendix A 
We define the stationary strategy sets E, E = ni Ei = ni Ilt EL where E� = Prob(sD ; 
and its element a( s) = Ilt at( st) = ni Ilt at( sD. We define the stationary Nash equi­
librium in this game following Mckelvey and Riezman [9]. That is, the stationary Nash 
equilibrium is characterized by a set of values { vt} � Rn for each stage of the game, and 
a strategy profile a* E E, such that 
a) Vt, a* is Nash equilibrium with payoff function Gt : Et --+ Rn defined by 
Gt(at; v) = u(1ft(at)) + L 7rt(at)(y)vY 
yET 
Eat[u(1ft(st)) + L 7rt(st)(y)vY] 
yET 
Next, we define the stochastic game that we use to model unanimity rule. Let T = 
Mo U Mi U D U R U P U V be the set of states. An element of T will be denoted by 
t. We use y to denote the possible states the game moves to. We use M0 to denote 
Termination Game 0, M1 to denote Termination Game 1, D to denote the Discounting 
Game, R to denote the Recognition Game, P to denote the Proposal Game, and V to 
denote the Voting Game. 
Under the sequential recognition rule, the strategy sets, transition functions and out­
come functions for the game elements are defined as follows: 
Fort E Mo: 
(Termination Game O) 
Sf = { 0} , Vi E N, 
7rt(st)(O) = 1, 
1/Jt(st) = </>, Vst E St. 
If t E M0, we are in the Termination Game 0, where the whole game terminates. Here 
each player's strategy set is {O} ,  the probability that the game stays at this stage is one, 
and the null outcome prevails. 
Fort ED: 
(Discounting Game) 
Sf = {O}, Vi E N, 
7rt(st)(O) = { � - 8 
1/Jt(st) = </>, Vst E St. 
if y ER, 
if y E Mo, 
If t E D, we are in the Discounting Game, where each player's strategy set is {O}. With 
probability 1 - 8 the game proceeds to the Termination game 0, where the whole game 
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terminates; with probability 8 the game goes to the Recognition Game. This is equivalent 
to saying that the players discount the future payoffs at the rate 8 (See Mckelvey and 
Riezman [9]) . Next, 
Fort E Mi: 
(Termination Game 1)  
Sf = {O} ,  Vi E N, 
7rt(st)(y) = 1, if y ED, 
1/;t(st) = </>, Vst E St. 
If t E Mi, we are in Termination Game 1, where a proposal is accepted by every 
player and becomes the new status quo. The game proceeds to the Discounting Game 
with probability one, and the null outcome prevails. The reason we call Mi a termination 
game is that when the new status quo is inside the intersection of the Pareto optimal 
set and the Pareto superior set, by Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 and 3, it will remain in 
effect forever. We can then use the discounted infinite stream of payoffs as the value of 
the game and terminate the game. 
Fort E R: Sf = {O}, Vi E N, 
(Recognition Game) 7rt(st)(y) = 1,if y E P 
1/;t(st) = </>, Vst E St. 
The Recognition Game is indexed by t E R. We assume that there is an exogenously 
given order of recognition; therefore, the strategy set of each player is {O}. The game 
proceeds to the Proposal Game with probability 1 ,  and the null outcome prevails. 
Fort E P: 
(Proposa.l Game) 
In the Proposal Game, the strategy set for the Proposer is the set of policy positions 
{ xi} ,  while the strategy set for each voter is still {O}. The game proceeds to the Voting 
Game with probability one, and the null outcome prevails in this game. 
Fort EV: 
(Voting Game) 
Sf = { 0, 1}, Vi E N, 
7rt(st)(y) = 1,if st = 1 and y E Mi, 
7rt(st)(y) = 1,if st = 0 and y ED, 
.1.t( t) = { x� if st = 1 ,  V t St '// s "f t 0 s E . Xo i S = , 
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In the Voting Game, each player can veto or accept (0 or 1) the new proposal. If the 
new proposal, x;, is accepted by all players , it becomes the new status quo and the game 
moves to M1; if it is vetoed by one or more players, the old status quo, x0, prevails and 
the game moves to D. 
1.5 
Appendix B 
Lemma 3 There exists a Nash equilibrium strategy that satisfies the following prop­
erties: 
Xi E Xso, Vi E N; 
gi(x;) = 0, if x; r/. Xso, where Xso = Xpo n Xps. 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
(1) For Proposer i, if he chooses Xi E Xso, the corresponding payoff is 
If he defects from this strategy, and proposes x; rf. Xso, the voters, following their 
equilibrium strategies, will veto this proposal, i.e., g(x;) = 0. The status quo prevails 
and the game moves to the next proposer. Therefore, his corresponding payoff is 
Take the difference of the two payoffs, we get 
) 
'
) ( [
u;(xi) 
) ( 
)] G(x; - G(xi = g x;) ---c - u;(xo - D;v; xo . 1 - Vi 
Suppose �;��;} < u;(x0) + 8;v;(x0), then 
u;(x;) Xi tf. argm,axxEXs0--, 1 - 8; 
This contradicts the assumption on the maximizing behavior of the players. Therefore, 
u;l�i/ - ui(x0) - 8iv;(x0) � 0. And since g(x;) � 0, we have G(x;) � G(x';). So the 
proposer has no positive incentive to defect unilaterally from the equilibrium proposal. 
(2 )  For the voters, the strategy specified in the lemma is gj(x;) = 0, Vj, if :r; tf. Xso. 
Suppose voter k defects from the specified strategy, i.e., gk( x;) = 1,  if x; tf. Xso. Since 
no other voter defects from the specified strategy, i.e., gJ(x;) = 0, Vj # k, if x; r/. Xso, 
then g(x;) = TI#i gj(;r;) = 0. Therefore, the unilateral defection of any single voter can 
not change the outcome or his own payoff. 
It follows that no voter will have a positive incentive to defect unilaterally from the 
specified strategy in Lemma 1, which is the Nash equilibrium strategy. Q.E.D. 
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The following lemma will be used to prove Propositions 2 and 3. 
Lemma 4 The optimal Xi of the proposer's constrained maximization problem is 
obtained when all constraints are binding. 
Proof of Lemma 4: Proposer i will make a proposal such that 
Since Xi E Xso, we have 
So Proposer i maximizes his objective function when g( xi) = 1. 
Next we specify when this condition is satisfied. For voter j, he chooses 
gj(Xi) E argmax{o,1}g( xi)[uJ( xi) + 8jVj( xi)] + (1 -g( xi))[uj( xo) + 8jvj( xo)]. 
When 91(xi) = 1, he gets g(:i:i)[uj( xi) + 81vJ(xi)] + (1 -g( xi))[uj( xo) + 8jvj(xo)]. When 
9j(xi) = 0, he gets uj( xo) + 8jvj(xo). 
Therefore, gJ(xi) = 1, iff 
g(xi)[uj(xi) + 8jvj(xi)] + (1 -g(xi))[uJ( xo) + 8jvj(xo)] > Uj(xo) + 8jvj(xo), 
{::? uj(xi) + 8jvj(xi) > Uj(xo) + bjvj(xo). 
It follows that g(xi) = 1 iff 
uj(.?:i) + bjvj( xi) � Uj( xo) + bjvj(xo), Vj "Ii. 
Also, we know that u;( xi) + btu;( xi) = u;��;/, Vi E N. 
Then proposer i's maximization problem is simplified to 
Suppose 
maXx;EXso [ui( xi)] 
Uj( x;) 
( )  c ( )v ·--1.· s.t.1 - 8 � tlj Xo + UjVj Xo ' J -;- z. J 
Xi E a rgmax EXso[u;(x;)] 
uj( xi) ( )  ' ( )v· --1. · s.t. - -,- = Uj Xo + UjVj Xo ' J -;- z, 1 - u ·  J 
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and 
It follows that um(lxi - aml) > um(xi). Since both Xi, Xi E Xpo, and Vj(xi) = 
Vj(Xi),Vj =/; i,m, from the definition of Pareto optimality, proposer i is worse off from 
the new proposal, i.e., ui(lxi - a;I) < u;(x;). By induction, it follows that the policy 
position that maximizes the proposer's own utility is obtained by solving the constrained 
maximization problem when all constraints are binding. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix C 
In the subsequent text, we employ the following notations: Vii - u;��:), ui = ui(x0) . 
Proposition 2 The following is a stationary Nash equilibrium to the veto game under 
sequential proposing rule: 
For t E P and i = t (Proposer i): 
where k = { j - i.' . 
n - z + J, 
For t E V  and j E N  - {t} (Voter j): 
if j > i 
if j < i. 
·( ·) _ , z 1_8 _ vj x, { 1 f 
u1(x;) > * ( ·) 
9J x, - ) 0, otherwise, 
h * ( · ) _ 'l\"k-l cl ·( ) + _!1_ · ( · ) w ere vj x, - L... i=O o1 u J x0 1_8 uJ xJ . ) 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The main steps to prove Proposition 2 follow the definition of stationary Nash equilib­
rium in the previous section. We first specify the values associated with the equilibrium 
strategies, and then show that these values are self-generating. The third step is to show 
that the strategies specified in the proposition are Nash equilibria. 
The values of the games are defined below. The interpretations of these values go 
back to the definitions of each game elements above. 
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Fort E Mo: 
(Termination Game 0) 
Fort E Mi: 
(Termination Game 1) 
Fort E D: 
(Discounting Game) 
Fort E R: 
(Recognition Game) 
Fort E P: 
(Proposal Game) 
Fort E V: 
(Voting Game) 
vf = 0, Vi E N. 
vf = 8v!Rl, Vi E N. 
vf = v!Rl, Vi E N. 
v �( x·) = u;(x;) for i = t t i 1-6; ' ' k 
t (  ·) _ "k-1 rt · ( · ) � · ( · ) f · N {t} vj x, - L.J/=O vjuJ x, + 1_6 uJ xJ , or J E - , J 
where 
Xi E argmaxxEXso[ui ( xi)] 
t u7 (x; ) _ '°'k-l d · ( ) _!J__ · ( · ) V · N {t} s .. 1_6 - l..J l=O vjuJ Xo + 1_6 uJ xJ , J E - . J J 
vf = Tii s �v <1> + (1 - Tii s D[u( xo) + 8v(R)J, Vi E N. 
The next step is to verify that these values are self-generating, i.e., that they corre­
spond to the payoffs under the equilibrium strategies. To do this, we plug the equilibrium 
strategies and other game elements into the definition of G, and show that they equal 
the corresponding values. 
For t E M0: (T ermination Game 0) 
Eat[u( ?f,t ( st)) + L 7rt( st)( y)vY] 
yET 
u(</>) + 7rt(st)(y) . vt = vt. 
For t E M1: (T ermination Game 1) 
Fort E D: (Discounting Game) 
yET 
u( </>) + 7rt( st) ( y) . v(x!,1) 
t v . 
yET 
u( </>) + 8v(R) + (1 - 8)v(o) 
DV(R) = Vt. 
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Fort E R: (Recognition Game) 
Gt( at,vt) - Eut[u( tPt( st))+ L7rt( st) ( y)vY] 
Fort E P: (Proposal Game) 
For i = t (Proposer i): 
For j = N - {t} (Voter j): 
yET 
- u(</>) + 7rt( st)( y) . vt 
- V(R ) = Vt. 
= 
Ui ( xi) 
1 -8i 
- vf{x;). 
yET 
Gj ( at; v j ( xi)) = Eut[U( tPt( st)) + L ?rt( st) ( y)vY] 
Fort E V :  (Voting Game) 
yET 
1 - bj 
k-1 EJk 
= L 8;uj(xo) + �uj(xj) 
l=O 1 -Vj 
- vj(x;). 
Gt( at, vt) = Eut[u(tPt(st)) + L 7rt( st) ( y)vY] 
yET 
- II sHu( </>) + 1 · v(ll] + (1 - II sD[u(xo) + 1 · v(D)] 
= II s�v(l ) + (1 -II s;)[u(xo) + 8v(R)] 
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Next, we verify that the strategies specified in Proposition 2 are Nash equilibrium 
strategies. We do this by showing that for each game element no player will benefit from 
a unilateral one-shot deviation. 
For t E P, we want to show that policy position Xi is the equilibrium strategy for 
Proposer i, where 
The corresponding payoff is 
Gt( t. t( ·)) = Ui ( xi) 1 a ,v Xi c . 1 - Vi 
If the proposer defects to any other pure strategy x; :f x; ,  and since u;(·) is monotone, 
Vi E N, there are two possible consequences: 
(i) ui( x;) :::; ui( x;): 
he is not better off by defection, so he will not defect in this case. 
(ii) ui( x;) > ui( xi ): 
I fjk 
0 h' 'f Uj(X) - ""k-l r/ ( ) __J_ ( ) '11 h ld v • _/.. 0 h mt 1s case, 1 -t::'6 L.i=O v Uj x; + 1_8 Uj Xj sti o s, J 1 z, t en 
J J 
Xi</. argmax EXso[ui( xi )] 
( ) k-1 8k Uj Xi '"""' I ( ) j ( ) V . .../.. . s. t. - - c - = L..,, 8;Uj Xo + - -c- Uj Xj ' J I z, 1 - V j l=O 1 - V j 
but this contradicts the definition of x;. Therefore the n - 1 constraints cannot 
hold simultaneously: at least one of them has to be violated. Since all voters still use 
their equilibrium strategy, whoever gets a lower continuation value vetos the proposal. 
Consequently, g( x;) = ITj g1(x;) = 0 ,  and i's payoff is 
yET 
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Therefore, GHa;, a�J; vI(x;))::::; GHat; vt(xi)). So the proposer has no positive incen­
tive to defect unilaterally from his strategy specified in Proposition 2, which means that 
it is a Nash equilibrium for the Proposer. 
For t E V ,  we want to check if voters' strategies specified in the proposition are Nash 
equilbrium strategies. This can be done in two steps: 
(1 )  Suppose Xi is such that 
the corresponding equilibrium strategy is Sj = 9j(xi) = 1,  and the payoff is 
If he defects from his equilibrium strategy for one period, i.e., s� = 9j(xi) = 0, player j's 
corresponding payoff will be 
Therefore, 
> 0, 
so voter j has no positive incentive to defect from his stated strategy in this situation. 
(2) Suppose x; is such that 
the corresponding equilibrium strategy for player j is Sj = gj(xi) = 0, and the payoff is 
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If he defects from his equilibrium strategy for one period, i.e., s� = gj(xi) = 1,  player 
j's corresponding payoff will be 
Therefore, 
> 0, 
so voter j has no positive incentive to defect from his stated strategy in this situation. 
From (1) and (2) , we know any voter j has no positive incentive to defect unilaterally 
from his strategies specified in Proposition 2, which in turn means tha.t they are Nash 
equilibrium strategies for voter j. Q.E.D. 
Under the random recognition rule, let T =Mo U M1 U DUR UP UV be the set of 
states. 
The strategy sets, transition functions and outcome functions for the game elements 
are the same as those in the sequential recognition rule. 
Proposition 3 The following is a stationary Nash equilibrium under a random 
recognition rule: 
For Proposer i: 
For Voter j: 
Xi E argmaxxEX50[ui(xi)] 
� 
Uj(xi) _ nuj(xo) + 8jVjj = ".' w · =/= . .t. , -
( )
' _ v3,v] z.  1 - Vj n - n - 1 Vj 
1 f u1(x;.
) > * ' z 1-51 - vj 
0, otherwise. 
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Proof of Proposition 3: The values of the games are defined below: 
Fort E Mo: 
(Termination Game 0) 
Fort E M1: 
(Termination Game 1) 
Fort ED: 
(Discounting Game) 
Fort ER : 
(Recognition Game) 
Fort E P: 
(Proposal Game) 
Fort EV: 
(Voting Game) 
vf = 0, Vi E N. 
v! = hv!R)' Vi E N. 
vf = v!R), Vi E N. 
Vt (x ·) = u;(x;) for i = t i i 1-5; ' ' 
t( ·) _ nu1 (xo)+51v;z.e · E N _ {t} VJ Xi - n-(n-1)51 !Of J ' 
where 
Xi E argmaxxEXso[ui(xi)] 
t u1 (x;) = nuj (xo)+51v11 V · E N _ {t} 8· · 1-51 n-(n-1)5j ' J · 
vf = TI; s�v (l) + (1 -TI; sD[u(xo) + 15v(R)] , Vi E N. 
Then we verify that these values are self-generating, i.e., they equal the payoffs of the 
game. 
Fort E M0: ( Termination Game 0) 
Eat[u(1j!t(st)) + L 7rt(st)(y)vY] 
yET 
u( ¢) + 7rt( st)(y) . v t = v t. 
For t E M1: ( Termination Game 1) 
Fort E D: ( Discounting Game) 
Eat [u(1j, t(st)) + L 7rt(st)(y)vY] 
yET 
u(</>) + 7rt(st)(y) . v (x�,1) 
Vt. 
yET 
u( ¢) + <5v(R) + (1 -8)v(o) 
OV(R) = Vt. 
2.5 
Fort E R: (Recognition Game) 
For t E P: (Proposal Game) 
For i = t (Proposer i): 
For j = N -{t} (Voter j): 
Eui[u(1/Jt(st)) + L 7rt(st)(y)vY] 
yET 
u(</>) + 7rt(st)(y). vt 
V(R) = Vt. 
1 -8i 
= vH xi). 
yET 
G;(a-t; vj(x;)) = Eat[u(1/Jt(st)) + L 1rt(st)(y)vY] 
Fort E V: ( Voting Game) 
= 
= 
Uj(Xi) 
1 - 8j 
yET 
nui(x0) + 8jVjj 
n-(n-l)8i' 
= vj(xi). 
ct(a-t, vt) - Eat[u(�,t(st)) +I: ?rt(st)(y)vY] 
yET 
= II s;[u(¢) + 1 · v(l)] + (1 - II s;)[u(x0) + 1 · v(D)J 
= II slv(l) + (1 - II sD[u(xo) + 8v(R)J 
= Vt. 
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The third step is to show that the strategies specified in Proposition 3 are Na.sh 
equilibrium strategies, i.e., that for each game element no player will benefit from a 
unilateral one-shot defection. 
For t E P: we want to show that policy position Xi is an equilibrium strategy for 
Proposer i, where: 
The corresponding payoff is 
Gt( t. t( ·)) = Ui(Xi) 1 fJ , V X1 ;: • 1 -Vi 
If the proposer defects to any other pure strategy x: -=/: Xi , and since ui( · ) is monotone, 
Vi E N, there are two possible consequences: 
(i) ui( x:) :::; ui( xi): he is not better off by defection, so he will not defect in this case. 
(ii) ui( x:) > ui(xi): in this case, if u{��:) = vj still holds Vj-=/: i, then 
Xi r/. argmax EXso[ui( xi)] 
Uj( xi) * \;/. __/.. . s.t.
1 
_ O· = vj, J 1 z,  J 
but this contradicts the definition of Xi. Therefore the n - 1 constraints cannot hold 
simultaneously: at least one of them has to be violated. Since all voters still use their 
equilibrium strategy, whoever gets a lower continuation value vetos the proposal. Con­
sequently, g( x:) = Tij gj( x;) = 0, and i's payoff is 
Therefore, 
Ea1[u(�t(s1)) + L 7rt(s
1)(y)vY] 
yET 
u1(</>) + 1 · [u1( xo) + Divi( xo)] 
uj( xo) + Divi( xo)]. 
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To show that Xi is a Nash equilibrium strategy, it suffices to show that the above 
expression is less than or equal to zero, i.e., 
( ) c 
nui( x0) + biVii 
Uj Xo + Ui ( ) c n - n -1 ui 
nb 
{:} (1 + 
( )b
)ui( xo)) < n- n-l 
(J2 
(1 -
( )c
)vii 
n - n -l u 
< (n-(n-l)8-82)
ui( xi) 
1 -bi 
which holds obviously, since Xi E Xso. Therefore, GHa;, a�i; vf( x;)) � GHat; vt( x;)). So, 
the proposer has no positive incentive to defect from the stated strategy, which is proven 
to be the Nash equilibrium strategy. 
Last, we show that voter j's strategy in Proposition 3 is Nash equilibrium strategy. 
Since this part of the proof is similar to the corresponding part in the proof of Proposition 
2, we will not repeat it here. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4 When veto by a player causes the default outcome to be xo (j. Xpo U 
Xps, a Pareto optimal rotation scheme 0( x1, x2, • • • , xn, x1, x2, · · · , xn, · · · ) can be sup­
ported as a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: 
We want to show that when O( x1 , x2, • • · , xn, · · · ) E XDPO and xo (j. Xpo U Xps, in 
equilibrium, for proposer i, Xi = xi; and for voter j, 9j( xi) = 1 if Xi = xi, g;( xi) = 0 if 
Xi -=!= Xi. 
For proposer i, if Xi = xi, his payoff function Gi( xi) = Ui( O), given that everyone 
else follows their equilibrium strategies. If Xi =I- xi, c;( xi) = Ui( O) + Ui( xo) -ui( xi). 
Since ui( x0) - ui( xi) < o, c;( xi) < G;( x;), i.e., he is worse off defecting from the optimal 
rotation path. Therefore, it is a Nash equilibrium for any proposer to offer the policy in 
the rotation path. 
For voter j, when x; = xi, 9i( x;) = 1 gives him Gj( xi) = Uj( O), while 9i( x;) = 0 
gives him G�( x;) = Uj(O) + ui( x0) -u;(:ri) < Gj( xi), therefore, it is a Nash equilibrium 
for him to accept when the proposal is a.long the equilibrium path. Consider the second 
case, when x; =f- xi, given that all other voters still follow their equilibrium strategies, 
g( xi) = 0 regardless of voter j's decision. Therefore, he is not better off ddecting from 
the specified strategy, which is a Nash equilibrium strategy. 
Q.E.D. 
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